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The Return of Timberlane?: The Fifth
Circuit Signals a Return to Restrictive
Notions of ExtraterritorialAntitrust
ABSTRACT

Over the past 100 years, the United States has remained
ambivalent regarding the potential extraterritorialapplication
of its antitrust laws. The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches began with a doctrine of strict territoriality but
promptly shifted toward an examination of the effects of the
antitrust activity on U.S. commerce. Since the 1970s, the
branches of government have refrained the question as one of
statutory
interpretation, embraced
considerations of
international comity, modified those considerations, and
eventually rejected many of those same considerations.
Throughout this chaos, however, the results reached by the
various branches of government have typically been consistent
with the economic theory of internationalantitrust. This theory
suggests that a country will use its domestic antitrust laws to
regulate foreign conduct when that country is both a net
importer and maintains the political power to compel
international compliance. Thus, with one major deviation in
the 1970s, the United States, since becoming a net importer, has
extended jurisdiction over foreign parties for antitrust activity
organized and occurring abroad whenever it has maintained
sufficient internationalpoliticalpower.
The Fifth Circuit has now entered the debate on
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. In Den
Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., the court, in an
opinion rooted solely in statutory interpretation, declined to
exercise jurisdictionover the claims of a foreign plaintiff injured
by cartel activity occurring exclusively outside of the United
States. While this result may seem consistent with traditional
notions of the role of U.S. courts, it is inconsistent with both the
economic theory of international antitrust and the antitrust
laws' goal of protecting the U.S. consuming public. This Note
argues that the Fifth Circuit should have exercised jurisdiction
over the foreign plaintiff's claims, thereby protecting U.S.
consumers from rising prices and avoiding further uncertainty
regardingthe extraterritorialapplicationof U.S. antitrust law.
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THE RETURN OFTIMBERLANE?
I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the stated goal of protecting the U.S. consuming public,
the United States has remained ambivalent regarding the potential
extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws. In domestic cases,
the courts and legislature have oscillated between the per se and rule
of reason tests to determine antitrust violations.
The debate
regarding extraterritorial application, meanwhile, has been far more
complex. The various branches of government began with a doctrine
of strict territoriality that required that the antitrust activity occur in
U.S. territory but promptly shifted toward an examination of the
effects of the antitrust activity on U.S. commerce to determine
violations.
Since the 1970s, the branches of government have
refrained the question as one of statutory interpretation, embraced
considerations of international comity, modified those considerations,
and eventually rejected many of those same considerations.
Throughout this chaos, however, the results of extraterritorial
antitrust enforcement have been remarkably consistent with the
economic theory of international antitrust. This theory suggests that
a country will use its domestic antitrust laws to regulate foreign
antitrust activity when that country is both a net importer and
maintains the political power to compel international compliance.
Thus, with one major deviation in the 1970s, the United States, since
becoming a net importer, has extended jurisdiction over foreign
defendants for antitrust activity organized and occurring abroad
whenever it has maintained sufficient international political power.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has now entered
the debate on extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. In
Den Norske Stats Qjeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., the court declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the claims of a foreign plaintiff injured by
cartel activity organized and occurring exclusively outside of U.S.
territory. While this result may seem consistent with traditional
notions of the role of U.S. courts, it is inconsistent with both the
economic theory of international antitrust and the antitrust laws'
goal of protecting the U.S. consuming public. This Note examines
Den Norske and attempts to place it within the context of the history
and continuing debate regarding extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law.
Part II develops the economic theory of international antitrust
that guides the analysis of later sections. Part III describes the
origins of extraterritorial antitrust in the United States while Part IV
traces the more recent history. Part V discusses the statutory and
executive developments of the last 20 years, which attempt to clarify
the government's position on the use of U.S. law to regulate foreign
antitrust conduct.
Part VI examines the Fifth Circuit's recent
decision in Den Norske that exemplifies the confusion and discomfort
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that U.S. courts feel in exercising subject matter jurisdiction in
claims involving extraterritorial antitrust activity. Finally, Part VII
recapitulates and shares some parting thoughts.

II. THE

ECONOMIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

Scholars reason that there is a globally efficient level of antitrust
This level, equilibrium, theoretically occurs when the
activity.1
marginal benefits of economies of scale from the creation of larger2
firms and cartels equal the marginal costs of those activities.
Countries, however, typically pursue independent, national antitrust
policies, thereby maximizing national welfare rather than cooperating
Therefore, despite greater overall
to maximize global welfare. 3
economic cooperation through the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the European Union, the level of global antitrust
4
Nevertheless, economics
remains skewed from its optimal level.
provides several predictions regarding how and when competing
5
Although
countries will manage their national antitrust policies.
they are only a small subset of antitrust activity, mergers are used in
this Note as a framework for developing more general economic-based
antitrust policy predictions.

See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73
1.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998). Most areas of international law have not extensively adopted
economic analysis because of seemingly inaccessible methodologies, conservative political
prejudices, and positivism and its presumed denigration of international law. Jeffrey L.
Danoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw, 24 YALE J. INT L. 1,
6 (1999). With scholars such as Eleanor Fox, Andrew T. Guzman, and Diane Wood,
international antitrust is an exception. Thus, economic reasoning aids the antitrust scholar
because "there is broad consensus that antitrust law rightly depends on economic analysis
to decide many issues... " Ronald A. Cass, InternationalTrade and UnfairImports: Price
Discriminationand PredationAnalysis in Antitrust and International Trade:A Comment,
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 877, 878 (1993). Moreover, "both courts and the relevant enforcement
agencies ... have been influenced by the substantial body of positive economic writings on
these subjects [antitrust constraints], often explicitly relying on recent academic literature."
Id.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1509.
2.
Id. at 1504.
3.
Accord William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an
4.
Legal
International Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 1017 (2002).
commentary has acknowledged this skewed effect and favors efforts aimed at further
harmonization and internationalization of competition law. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox,
Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); But see Diane
Wood, A Cooperative Framework for National Regulators, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521,
524 (1996) (arguing national regulation is the best approach).
See generally Guzman, supra note 1; Sugden, supra note 4.
5.
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A. The ConceptualFramework
The basic economic model of international antitrust (Model 1)
assumes a world consisting of two countries.6 Country A is home to
all of the producers of the traded good while Country B is home to all
of the consumers. 7 Country A attempts to maximize profits for its
producers while Country B seeks to maintain low prices for its
consumers.8 Tension between these competing interests can arise
when two firms in the producer country plan a merger. 9 Although
this merger may be desirable from a global perspective, antitrust
policy is pursued at the national level.' 0 Thus, the producer country
will always approve the merger" while the consumer country will try
to block the combination if higher prices could reduce consumer
welfare. 12 Therefore, the ultimate disposition of the merger depends
13
on the relative political power of the two countries.
The isolation of producers and consumers in Model 1, however
simple, fails to accurately portray the world marketplace. 14 Model 2
relaxes this assumption of isolation as Country A continues to
produce the market good while Country B both produces and
consumes the good. 15 Country A continues to act in the same manner
as in Model 1; it will approve any merger proposal to maximize the
16
country's welfare through an increase in domestic producer surplus.
Country B's policymakers, on the other hand, must make a more
complex evaluation based on an analysis of the proposed merger's

6.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1512.
7.
Id. This one good represents a market basket of goods and services, thus
allowing the economist to examine the market for only one good. See OLIVIER
BLANCHARD, MACROECONOMICS 1-2 (1997).
8.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1515.
9.
Sugden, supra note 4, at 994.
10.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1514. The result of this phenomenon is that if
Country A gains ten utils via the merger and Country B loses five utils, Country B will
try to block the activity even though the merger is globally efficient, creating five utils
of wealth.
11.
A rationally acting producer firm does not seek to merge unless its producer
surplus increases. Thus, in a country that only produces, all mergers are approved
because the increase in producer surplus is a proxy for the goals of the country.
12.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1515. Thus, the government promotes local
interests and hopes to capture "the maximum possible benefits for locals while
externalizing as many costs as possible onto foreigners." Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust
and InternationalRegulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142, 1152 (2001). Thus,
countries frequently allow antitrust exemptions for export cartels because the harm
occurs abroad while domestic firms profit from the same activities. Id.
13.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1516.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
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impact on both producers and consumers. 17 Country B will allow the
merger if the net change to domestic producer and consumer surplus
is positive; without domestic efficiency gains, Country B will not
approve the combination. 18 The result is that "Country B will never
allow an activity that reduces global welfare because its own
consumers are the ones who would bear the loss."'19 However, some
activities that increase global welfare will also be blocked because
Country B's policymaking does not account for the welfare gains in
2
Country A.

0

Model 3 alters Model 2's assumptions, as Country A consumes
rather than produces while Country B continues to both produce and
consume. 2 1 Under this model, Country A does not approve any
mergers that reduce global welfare because its consumers would
suffer the negative effects. 2 2 Moreover, Country A will also block
some mergers that increase global welfare because Country A fails to
23
account for the increase in profits for Country B's producers.
Country B, on the other hand, approves all activities in which the net
change to domestic producer and consumer surplus is positive. 24 The
result is similar to that in Model 2 as some activities that increase
global welfare will be blocked.2 5 The difference, however, is that, in
Model 2, Country A always approves the merger despite global
inefficiency while under Model 3, Country A, as a nation of
26
consumers, blocks some activity despite global efficiency.
B. Implications to a Trading Marketplace
Without knowing the relative proportions of producers and
consumers in each country, it "is impossible to predict how a country
'27
will respond to an activity with potentially anticompetitive effects.
Nevertheless, both countries seek to "approve activities for which the
28
sum of the changes in producer and consumer surplus is positive."
Therefore, if each country both produces and consumes the same

17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 1517.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. For ease of comparison to Model 2, the Author has transposed the
variable names from Professor Guzman's model of a two consumer, one producer world.
22.
Id. at 1517-18.
23.
Id. at 1518.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
Compare id. at 1516 (concluding that Country A approves all proposed
26.
antitrust activity), with id. at 1517-18 (concluding that Country A refuses approval of
some proposed antitrust activity).
Id. at 1518-19.
27.
Id. at 1518.
28.
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percentage of world output, the global market achieves optimal levels
29
of antitrust.
A country that does not maintain a share of global consumption
equal to its global production, however, likely will not adopt the
optimal global policy. 30 This principle suggests that
[a] country whose firms are responsible for x% of global production will
take into account x% of the change in global producer surplus
generated by a particular activity. A country whose consumers account
for y% of global consumption will take into account y% of the total
31
change in global consumer surplus generated by the activity.

This logic results in a situation where "a country that can apply its
laws extraterritorially will underregulate anticompetitive behavior if
it is a net exporter and overregulate such behavior if it is a net
32
importer."
The preceding analysis, however, assumes that each country is
able to enforce its laws globally. 33 The power to enforce laws in the
international system is derived from a variety of factors, such as the
size of the country, the size of its market, and the prestige and
attractiveness of that market. 34
Moreover, even if a country
possesses sufficient power to enforce its antitrust policy abroad, it
will decline to do so when the cost of regulating extraterritorial
antitrust exceeds the benefits received. 35 Nevertheless, a large
country with a broad market can be expected to export its antitrust
laws, especially if other countries rely on it as a major international
36
trading partner.
Without transaction costs or political considerations, the efficient
37
level of global antitrust occurs regardless of the adopted legal rule.
Countries should pay or trade with each other to costlessly
redistribute income and maximize global surplus. 38 Transaction costs
and political considerations, however, are a reality of the economic
world. 39 Thus, the efficient outcome may not occur under every legal

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1519-20.
Id.
Id. at 1520.
Sugden, supranote 4, at 995-96.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1525.
Id.
Accord id. at 1524-29.

37.

A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12

(2d ed. 1989). Ronald H. Coase developed this principle regarding economic analysis of
law in 1960, which is popularly referred to as the Coase Theorem. See generally
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
38.
POLINSKY, supra note 37, at 12.
39.
Id.
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rule. 40 In antitrust, where the political clout of countries determines
the level of regulation, some efficient activity will be blocked if one
powerful country suffers a net loss, regardless of global benefits. 4 1
With transaction costs, a country that cannot enforce its laws
globally will have relatively weaker antitrust policies. 42 The country
can obviously prevent domestic firms from engaging in suboptimal
levels of antitrust, but domestic consumers can still be hurt by foreign
antitrust activity. 43 This country has a modified incentive structure
and will allow domestic firms to engage in anticompetitive activity "if
the change in domestic surplus plus the change in domestic profits is
greater when the activity is allowed than when it is prevented
domestically. '' 44 Thus, such a country prevents domestic firms from
engaging in profit decreasing antitrust activity but cannot prevent
foreign firms from decreasing domestic consumer surplus. 4 5 This
antitrust policy is weaker than the optimal global policy because
foreign countries cannot be compelled to follow the country's strong
domestic antitrust policy. 4 6 The result is an overabundance of
47
antitrust activity in that country's marketplace.
A country with extraterritoriality, on the other hand, will block
the anticompetitive activities of foreign firms, and even some of their
procompetitive activities, if either impedes the country's trade or
production. 48 The result is that in a world with extraterritoriality,
"the toughest law is the binding law because an inefficient activity
imposes a net loss on at least one country, and that country can
'49
prevent the activity through extraterritorial application of its laws.
Thus, all globally inefficient antitrust activities are prevented, but
some efficient activities are also blocked. 50 The prevailing law will
51
produce less antitrust activity than is optimal.

40.
41.

Id. at 13.
Guzman, supranote 1, at 1524.

42.

Id. at 1521.

43.

Id. at 1522.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 1523.

46.

Id. at 1524.

47.
Id. As international trade increases, the divergence in policy becomes more
acute, and the country becomes more vulnerable to politically powerful countries. Id.
48.
Id. at 1523. Professor Fox, however, argues that, in some instances, a
country with extraterritoriality will refrain from such exercise in hopes of attracting
business and investment or, because of the Theory of the Commons, saving on the
expense of enforcement. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism:Races
Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1794 (2000).
49.
Guzman, supra note 1, at 1524.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. Professor Guzman's attempts to explore these types of choice of law
issues through economics is '"by far the most comprehensive and rigorous" attempt to
do so. Paul B. Stephan, The PoliticalEconomy of Choice of Law, 90 GEo. L.J. 957, 969
(2002).
Moreover, a primary implication of this theory is that "[i]nternational
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THE ORIGINS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. Congress Legislates
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
In 1890, Congress used this
with the Indian Tribes ...."52
53
Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).
Sherman
the
enact
to
authorization
The United States was the first country to enact formal antitrust
laws, but Senator Sherman and other proponents believed that the
54
Sherman Act merely codified existing common law doctrines.
Section 1 provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal .... ,,55 Additionally § 2 makes it a crime to "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations ..."56
The U.S. Attorney's office may prosecute violations of the
Sherman Act in either a civil or criminal proceeding. 57 If the
government directly purchased goods from the party accused of
antitrust violations, it may obtain injunctive relief, damages, or both
through a civil proceeding. 58 Alternatively, the government may
prosecute all antitrust violations and seek imprisonment and fines of
59
up to ten million dollars.
The Sherman Act serves as the fundamental legislation
regarding antitrust, but it does not incorporate a provision for private
parties to sue third parties for alleged antitrust violations. 60 The
Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, grants these powers, as "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court

organizations can promote negotiations over substantive issues by facilitating transfer
payments," thereby reducing transaction costs and creating the most efficient outcome
regardless of the legal rule. Id. at 960.
52.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997).53.
54.
21 CONG. REC. 2456, 2457 (1890).
55.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
Id. § 2.
56.
57.
Id. §§ 1, 2, 4.
58.
Id. § 4; Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1997).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1997).
59.
See generally id. §§ 1-7.
60.
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of the United States.'
Successful parties may be awarded
62
injunctive relief or treble damages plus costs and attorney's fees.

B. The Courts Interpret
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act
literally, holding that the Sherman Act "renders illegal all
agreements which are in restraint of trade or commerce ....1"63 The
severity of the violation or the reasonableness of judicial intervention
did not affect this strict holding. 64 In 1911, however, the Court
adopted the "rule of reason" test, which required a finding of an
unreasonable or undue restraint of trade before antitrust activity
could be halted under the Sherman Act. 65 The Court, relying on
Congress' intent to codify common law, overruled prior precedent
because only "unreasonable restraint[s]" on trade were justiciable
66
prior to enactment of the Sherman Act.
1. The Courts Consider Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Despite the plethora of litigation concerning domestic antitrust,
the Court did not consider the potential extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act until 1909 when it heard oral arguments in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.6 7 The Court, led by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, initially expressed surprise that U.S.
antitrust law might apply extraterritorially. 68 United Fruit, a U.S.
corporation, maintained a longstanding monopoly of the banana trade
through its plantations in Panama, which was then part of the

61.
Id. § 15(a).
62.
Id.
63.
United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897)
(emphasis added). The Court believed that Congress should address any policy
considerations that negated the literal interpretation. Id. at 340.
Many scholars
argue that, in the Trans-Missouri opinion, Justice Peckham intended to outlaw "all
naked horizontal restraints" in part because of a concern "about the fate of 'small
dealers and worthy men' at the hands of large trusts." Alan J. Meese, Liberty and
Antitrust in the FormativeEra, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1999).
64.
Trans-Mo., 166 U.S. at 341.
65.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54, 60 (1911).
66.
Id. at 54. The Court, however, would continue to waiver on the rule of reason
and per se approaches to antitrust analysis. Milton Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (1982). Moreover, although the judiciary and legislature
have modified pertinent antitrust doctrines, they have hesitated to correct a series of
aberrations from accepted norms. Id. at 1289.
67.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
68.
Id. at 355.

20031

THE RETURN OFTIMBERLANE?

United States of Colombia. 6 9 In 1903, American Banana, also a U.S.
corporation, harvested a banana crop from a new Panamanian
plantation in a territory administered by Costa Rica. 70 United Fruit,
which was subsidized by the Costa Rican military, promptly
confronted American Banana and demanded that either business
71
cease or the American Banana operation merge into United Fruit.
American Banana declined both options. 72 United Fruit, which would
lose substantial profits should its monopoly cease, induced the Costa
Rican government 73 to seize a part of American Banana's plantation
and a cargo of its supplies. 74 Costa Rica then awarded the property to
one of its citizens. 75 Rather than contest these actions in a Costa
Rican court, where Costa Rica would presumably prevail, American
Banana challenged United Fruit's monopoly in U.S. court, alleging
76
violations of the Sherman Act.
Justice Holmes, who felt the Sherman Act was foolish, affirmed
the circuit court 77 and Circuit Court of Appeals, dismissing American
Banana's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 78 Using
conflict of laws cases to support the prevailing notions of strict
territoriality, Justice Holmes foreclosed extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act. 79 The Court reasoned that "the general and almost

69.

Id. at 354.

For an in-depth discussion of the impact of United Fruit in

Central America, see generally STACY MAY & GALO PLAZA, THE UNITED
COMPANY IN LATIN AMERICA (1958).

FRUIT

70.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 354. McConnell actually owned the plantation at
its inception in 1903 but sold the property to American Banana in June 1904. Id.
American Banana retained control of the plantation throughout the litigation process.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
American Banana also alleged that these actions were outside of the
jurisdiction of Costa Rica because Panama had become an independent sovereign in
November 1903. Id. at 354-55.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 355.
76.
Id. at 353.
77.
Id. at 359. In 1909 the circuit court served as the federal trial court. See
Thomas E. Baker, A Primer on the Jurisdictionof the U.S. Courts of Appeals, FED. JUD.
CENTER EDUC. & TRAINING SERIES, at § 1.03, availableat 1989 WL 270242 (1989).
78.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 353, 357; Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of
Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 641 (2001).
79.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 359; William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 114 (1998).
Holmes relied heavily on the principles of Slater v. Mexican National Railroad, where
he had advised the plaintiffs to sue "in Mexico, on the other side of the river," where
the fatal injury occurred. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 129 (1904). The
rationale for this result is the "vested rights" theory of conflict of laws, which bases the
source of legal obligations on the law of the place of the act. Russell J. Weintraub, The
ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the
Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1807-08 (1992).

Justice

Holmes preferred the term "obligatio"to "vested rights," although both refer to the idea
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universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done," except where the statute specifically stated otherwise.80 The
Court believed that to act otherwise would be unjust and constitute
an undue interference with the authority of another country.81
Therefore, because United Fruit's alleged antitrust activities had
occurred outside U.S. borders, the Sherman Act and other U.S. laws
82
could not regulate the conduct.
American Banana, at its narrowest, has been read to suggest
that the United States cannot impose liability on companies whose
conduct takes place both domestically and internationally.8 3 At its
broadest, Justice Holmes presented an interpretation of the Sherman
Act that precluded application of U.S. antitrust laws to conduct that
occurs outside of the United States, regardless of the nature and
degree of domestic effects.8 4
Nevertheless, Holmes' notion of
international comity is one in which the home country and its laws
serve as the primary and perhaps exclusive forum for regulation of
antitrust violations.8 5 This result was consistent with the liberalist
view of international conflicts that powered the U.S. political system
before World War 1.86 Cooperation, rather than conflict, was believed
to create stability in the international system, and therefore, no
country should impose order on another.8 7 Moreover, although a
major economic player and importer, the United States lacked clout

that foreign law is given effect as a matter of law. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality
and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 101, 111-12 (1998).
80.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356. This language is authority for both the
general presumption against extraterritoriality and the specific presumption against
the extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act. William Dwight Whitney, Sources of
Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655, 657
(1954). The general presumption, however, was not invented by Justice Holmes, but
rather by Justices Marshall and Story nearly 100 years earlier in The Schooner
Charming Betsy and The Appollon. Id. at 658. See also Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 361 (1824).
81.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356. Justice Holmes' manner of analysis suggests
that the Court's concern "was less congressional intent than congressional authority to
regulate activities abroad."
Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome'" Multinational
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598,
604 (1990).
82.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
83.
Larry Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law After the
Insurance Antitrust Case:A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 750, 751 (1995).
84.
Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356.
85.
Cf. id.
86.
For a more detailed discussion of the liberal conception of world order, see
generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 2-6 (1993).
87.
The highlight of this cooperation ideology would come after World War I as
President Woodrow Wilson proposed the League of Nations. Id. at 75.
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within the international scene and, therefore, lacked ability to enforce
its laws abroad.88
Thus, the economic theory of international
antitrust successfully accounts for the Court's result; the U.S.'s weak
extraterritorial antitrust policy allowed a welfare-destroying cartel to
continue operation.
2. The Court Reconsiders
As global tension heightened, the Court became more aggressive,
and the government prevailed in a series of enforcement actions that
concentrated on the effects of foreign antitrust activity on the
domestic economy.8 9 Four years after American Banana, the Court
narrowed Justice Holmes' presumption against extraterritoriality and
exercised jurisdiction over activities that occurred on the open seas
where there was presumably no sovereign government. 90 Then, the
Court asserted that U.S. courts may control all domestic activity
regardless of whether the acting party was American or foreign. 91
Finally, as the United States became active in World War I, the Court
shifted from the cooperation-based sentiments of liberalism and
began using U.S. law to regulate antitrust activity organized from
92
abroad but coordinated in the United States.
As the United States became more aggressive in the world
marketplace, the Court further narrowed the American Banana

88.
The United States became the world's largest economy in the 1880s, but
Great Britain continued to dominate the international system. Id. at 53-54.
89.
Swaine, supra note 78, at 641.
90.
United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106
(1913). The Canadian corporation's conduct occurred from both inside and outside U.S.
borders. Id. The Court, in sustaining the plaintiffs claims, treated this application as
an exception, thereby preserving the general rule that U.S. law has no extraterritorial
effect. Id. Nevertheless, the Court signaled a willingness to hear cases involving
foreign parties in actions occurring outside the territory of the United States. Turley,
supranote 81, at 609.
91.
Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. at 106.
92.
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1916). The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants interfered with trade by offering lower prices to U.S. companies shipping
goods exclusively on their shiplines. Id. at 68, 71-72. The U.S. Supreme Court
determined that, although the conspiracy was formed abroad, it was operated in the
United States and therefore affected U.S. foreign commerce within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 88. More importantly, the Court made a preliminary attempt at
phrasing extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in terms of effects: "[T]he
combination affected the foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation
here." Dodge, supra note 79, at 123 (quoting Thomsen, 243 U.S. at 88). Scholars
commended this relaxation of the rule against extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act because "anticompetitive activities are necessarily going to occur outside
the United States in many cases and the statutory purpose would be needlessly
sacrificed by a strict limit to U.S. activities." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1253-54 (2001).
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doctrine in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.93 The U.S. government
charged Sisal, a U.S. corporation, with conspiring to monopolize U.S.
sales of materials used in making rope. From its U.S. offices, Sisal
officials had allegedly induced Mexican government officials to create
favorable laws that recognized Sisal as the exclusive trader in such
The Court rejected traditional notions of foreign
materials. 9 4
government protection and immunity, holding that antitrust activity
occurring outside the United States, even if sanctioned by a foreign
government, faced possible regulation under the Sherman Act. 95 As a
result, Sisal was liable for Sherman Act violations. 96 With this
determination of liability, the Court completed its nearly systematic
both of which had
rejection of liberalism and strict territoriality,
97
guided Justice Holmes in American Banana.
In contrast to the propensity for world cooperation in the early
1900s, the post-World War I international system was influenced by
collective security. 98 Collective security was a liberal solution to the
perceived failures of the international system leading up to World
War 1. 9 The approach embraced the creation of liberal international
institutions such as the League of Nations and an international court
system. 10 0 Thus, the focus became worldwide cooperation through
democratic decisions made at the international level. 1° 1 Despite
sentiments rooted in cooperation, the United States had emerged as a
world power and was expected to influence these new international
institutions. With this power, the economic theory of international
antitrust suggests that the United States would begin to regulate

93.
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
Id. at 271.
94.
95.
Id. at 276. Under the facts of Sisal, Thomsen v. Cayser did not serve as
relevant precedent because Sisal's agreement was negotiated from the United States,
and then the conduct occurred abroad, causing direct effects on the U.S. market.
Therefore, the Court required a new, broader doctrine to regulate Sisal's conduct.
Id.
96.
See generally id. The Court distinguished American Banana from Sisal
97.
because, in the latter, "part of the conduct occurred in the United States and had
intentionally affected American trade." Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International
Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L

LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1996). The Court, however, never expressly overruled American
Banana, although "its authority has been so eroded by subsequent case law as to have
Zenith Radio Corp. v.
been effectively limited to its specific factual pattern."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 491 F. Supp. 1161, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
98.
NYE, supra note 86, at 74-76. Leading into World War I, the world had
embraced the balance of power approach, which represents a multipolar world. Id. at
56-57. This approach was widely blamed for the war, and thus collective security,
advocated by President Woodrow Wilson, became the systemic goal. Id. at 74.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
Id.
101.
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more closely a wider variety of foreign antitrust activity.1 0 2 Thus,
economics predicted the courts' rejection of strict territoriality in the
0 3
years following American Banana.1
3. The Court Adopts a New Approach
Following World War II, U.S. courts drastically extended their
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations through United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).'0 4 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting as a court of last resort via
certificate from the Supreme Court, 10 5 implicitly rejected the
American Banana approach of strict territorial application of the
Sherman Act.' 0 6 Alcoa, a U.S. corporation, maintained a Canadian
subsidiary, Aluminum Limited (Limited).10 7 Limited entered into a
cartel agreement with a French corporation, two German
corporations, one Swiss corporation, and one British corporation to
limit the supply of aluminum in the United States. l0 8 The U.S.
government challenged the cartel, which was protected by Swiss law,
in U.S. courts, alleging violations of the Sherman Act.10 9
The court, led by Judge Learned Hand, established the "intended
effects" test to determine whether a U.S. court should hear
complaints of extraterritorial antitrust activity." 0
Noting that
Congress did not intend for the Sherman Act to punish antitrust
activity without consequences on U.S. commerce, the court ruled that
U.S. courts may impose liability on foreign citizens and corporations
"for conduct outside [U.S.] borders that has consequences within
[U.S.] borders which the state reprehends. . . ."I"
The court,
however, limited this seemingly boundless doctrine by requiring a

102.
Heavy importers with power among other nations are expected to
overregulate antitrust activities. See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text.
103.
Id.
104.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
105.
The U.S. Supreme Court was unable to meet quorum and thus referred the
case to the Second Circuit under 15 U.S.C. § 29 as amended in 1944. This provision
was partially repealed in 1974. See 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1944) (partially repealed by 1974
amendments). Thus, for all intents and purposes, the Second Circuit's rationale was
binding on the other circuits.
106.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
107.
Id. at 421. Limited was formed on May 31, 1928 to take over the majority
of Alcoa's foreign operations. Id. at 439.
108.
Id. at 442.
109.
Accord id. at 443 (noting that the action arises under § 1 of the Sherman
Act).
110.
Id. at 421, 443-44. Professor Gunther argues that Judge Hand's opinion is
"flawed on several points and perhaps wrongly decided." Michael Boudin, The Master
Craftsman Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge, 47 STAN. L. REV. 363, 375-77
(1995).
111.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
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direct and intended effect on U.S. domestic commerce. 112 The court
further held that the Sherman Act does not apply to antitrust
activities with only an indirect effect on U.S. commerce, such as113a
limit on European supply that leads to an increase in U.S. prices.
Moreover, if domestic antitrust effects are lacking, regardless of
intent, the Sherman Act does not apply. 114 Limited's cartel intended
to suppress and restrain the exportation of aluminum to the United
States, thereby satisfying the intent requirement. 1 15 Furthermore,
limited supply raised domestic prices for aluminum, creating a direct
the court held that the cartel
effect on U.S. commerce. 116 Therefore,
117
agreement violated the Sherman Act.
The effects test gained rapid acceptance in the United States but
was met with resistance abroad. 1 18 The United States received harsh
criticism for neglecting to consider the interests of foreign
governments in regulating the commercial activity of their domestic
corporations under their own national laws. 119 The Alcoa decision,
however, is consistent with the economic theory of international
antitrust as well as the dominant political ideology of the mid-20th
Globalization led to more multinationals, and as it
century. 120
became the world's police force, the United States assumed a
prominent role in the international system. 121 Thus, the United
States maintained the political power necessary for extraterritorial

Id. at 443-44.
112.
113.
Id.
Id. at 444.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. Effects could be inferred by evidence showing a sharp increase in
116.
aluminum imports to the United States following dissolution of the cartel.
117.
Id. at 445. The monopolist, however, would argue that the plaintiffs
"suffered no antitrust injury since Alcoa had done no more than substitute its output
for that of the [plaintiffs]," which did not result in inefficiencies or restricted output.
William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445,
1480 (1985).
Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: The
118.
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1992). A
Canadian critique regarding the effects doctrine focuses on the ability of the United
States to reduce the foreign sovereign's control of activity under their control. See
generally J.S. Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the
United States: A View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
Alford, supra note 118, at 9.
119.
NYE, supra note 86, at 111. See also supra notes 1-51 and accompanying
120.
text.
See generally NYE, supra note 86, at 63, 98-131. A bipolar system is one in
121.
which the international system is driven by two competing hegemons. Id. at 30. This
system simplifies communication and calculations, but marginal conflicts are
magnified in degree because the system lacks flexibility. Id. at 122. The Cold War has
become a classic example of a bipolar system, with the United States and the former
Soviet Union clashing because of differing goals. Id. at 100. The original example,
however, is Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. See id. at 8-24.
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enforcement of its antitrust laws. 122 With these powers and status as
a net importer, U.S. courts, in creating and applying the effects test,
successfully followed the predictions of the economic theory of
international antitrust. 123 This success continued as the Court
subjected a foreign corporation to liability under the Sherman Act for
124
exercising powers directly conferred to it by its national sovereign.

IV. THE TIMBERLANE PROGENY
A. Considerationsof InternationalComity
In the 1970s, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
developed a tripartite analysis to guide the determination of whether
the Sherman Act should regulate extraterritorial antitrust
activities. 125 The Timberlane plaintiffs alleged that Bank of America,
N.A. officials and other unrelated persons located in the United
States and Honduras conspired to prevent Timberlane, a U.S.
corporation, from milling lumber in Honduras for export to the
United States. 126 As a result, a few individuals, financed by Bank of
America, maintained complete control over the Honduran lumber
export business. 127 In 1974, Timberlane challenged these actions in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. 128 In
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
failed to make specific findings of fact or extensive conclusions of law
but nevertheless concluded that the defendants' activities did not

122.
Accord id. at 63, 98-131.
123.
See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text.
124.
Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-08
(1962). Continental Ore produced and sold vanadium, a metal obtained from ores
mined in Colorado, while the defendants mined the ore. Id. at 691-92. Continental Ore
alleged that the defendants monopolized trade in the ore deposits by refusing to sell it
to outsiders. Id. at 693. The defendants had been appointed as an agent of the
Canadian government and had been delegated the power to act as the government acts,
but the Court still exercised jurisdiction over Continental Ore's claims. Id. at 702 n.il,
703, 707-08. This holding reflected the Supreme Court's implicit adoption of the
Second Circuit's Alcoa holding and the effects test. Salil K. Mehra, Extraterritorial
Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 191, 205 (1999).

125.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976).
126.
Id. at 601. Because the case originally rose under a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the court assumed the facts presented in
Timberlane's complaint as true.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
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have a direct and substantial0 effect on U.S. commerce. 129 On appeal,
13
the Ninth Circuit reversed.
While U.S. law can regulate some conduct beyond domestic
131
borders, the court concluded that it could not do so in all situations.
The court noted that other governments often resent extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, particularly when the United States
maintains only a weak interest in the conflict. 132 The court's task
became more difficult because, even though U.S. courts frequently
required substantial effects on domestic commerce before exercising
jurisdiction over extraterritorial activity, there was no consensus
133
among them regarding how far U.S. jurisdiction should extend.
Moreover, in the context of the Sherman Act, few cases examined the
Alcoa effects requirement because most filed cases involved obvious
violations. 134 Thus, with numerous disputes regarding distinctions of
direct and indirect effect and intent, the threshold for Alcoa effects
1 35
had not been adequately defined.
To define more rigidly the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law, the court developed a tripartite analysis. 136 First, the
antitrust laws require that there be some effect, either actual or
intended, on U.S. commerce. 137 Second, "a greater showing of burden
or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is
sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and,
therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws.' 38 Third, to quell
international criticism, the interests of the United States must be
sufficiently strong "vis-A-vis those of 39other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority."'

Id. The District Court also believed that the injuries were the result of acts
129.
of the Honduran government and therefore, under the act of state doctrine, the court
could not review the defendants' actions. Id. at 601 n.3.
Id. at 600.
130.
Id. at 609.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 610. Several courts used the direct and substantial effect formulation
133.
as a prerequisite to extending jurisdiction. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switz.
Info. Ctr., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) P70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82
F. Supp. 753, 891 n.17 (D.N.J. 1949). Other courts have used different formulations.
See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) ("a conspiracy ... which affects American commerce"); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and aff'd, 341 U.S.
593 (1951) ("a direct and influencing effect on trade").
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. at 613.
136.
Id.
137.
Id. (emphasis in original).
138.
Id.
139.
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This analysis shifts the question of extraterritorial application of
the antitrust laws from one of congressional intent to one of subject
matter jurisdiction. 140 Later courts have continued this mode of
analysis but additionally consider congressional intent as part of the
subject matter jurisdiction evaluation. 14 1 More importantly, however,
the court's tripartite analysis rejected the Alcoa effects test and
allowed for greater consideration of international comity: in the Ninth
Circuit, a mere effect on U.S. commerce would no longer be a
sufficient basis "on which to determine whether American authority
should be asserted in a given case as a matter of international comity
and fairness. 1 42 Thus, under the jurisdictional rule of reason, the
ultimate determination of jurisdiction hinges on international conflict
of laws principles.' 43 This fact intensive inquiry relies heavily on the
14 4
balancing of foreign interests under the third part of the analysis.
Therefore, before asserting jurisdiction, the District Court would need
to find that the United States had "a sufficiently strong interest" in
the matter through consideration of
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad. 145

Only after evaluation of these elements, which are in part derived
from the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, can a court hold that "the contacts and interests of the
United States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial
46
jurisdiction."'
Although Timberlane's claims were predominantly against
foreign defendants and most of the activity occurred in Honduras,
nothing in the record suggested a conflict with Honduran law. 14 7

140.
John A. Trenor, Comment, Jurisdictionand the ExtraterritorialApplication
of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1594-95 (1995).
141.
Id.
142.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (emphasis in original).
143.
Id. at 613-14.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id. at 614-15. See infra Part IV.C. for a discussion of the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Although the Timberlane
doctrine attempts to "restrain the application of seemingly strict law," it does not
purport to refine the general rule of intended effects. Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust
Jurisdiction Under Customary InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 785 (1984).

147.

Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
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Therefore, dismissal by the District Court on jurisdictional grounds
was inappropriate without evaluation of the claims under the
tripartite analysis. 148
The case was remanded, and on
reconsideration the District Court found extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act to be inappropriate. 149 The court found that the
interests of the United States were only derivative to the claims of its
citizens and that Honduran courts could provide Timberlane with
adequate relief. 150
Thus, as the original Timberlane court had
speculated, some antitrust claims brought in U.S. courts present
interests "of the United States [that] are too weak and the foreign
harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify extraterritorial
151
assertion of jurisdiction."'
As the Ninth Circuit accepted international comity as a
consideration in determining extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) grappled with the same ideas.
The resulting debate was in direct response to the business
community's belief that it was the victim of overzealous and perhaps
inconsistent antitrust enforcement.' 52 As a result, on January 26,
1977, the DOJ issued its first Antitrust Guide for International
Operations (1977 Guide). 153 The 1977 Guide sought to "provide a
working statement of government enforcement policy," while
maintaining protection for the U.S. consuming public through
assurance of the benefits of competitive products. 154 The 1977 Guide
also reinforced the DOJ's goal of protecting U.S. export opportunities
from privately imposed restrictions. 155 Finally, the 1977 Guide
recognized that, although U.S. antitrust laws are not limited to solely
domestic application, enforcement activity regarding foreign
transactions can occur only when the activity has a substantial and
foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. 15 6 The DOJ, however, retracted
from this expansive notion of the United States as the world's
antitrust police and required evaluation of international comity
considerations before the exercise of jurisdiction, thereby adopting
the essence of the Timberlane analysis. 15 7 Thus, if the United States

148.

Id.

149.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 574 F.
Supp. 1453, 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
150.
Id.
151.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609.
152.
United States Department of Justice Antitrust Guide for International
Operations, reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) NO. 799 (Feb. 1,
1977) [hereinafter 1977 Guide].
153.

Id.

154.
155.
156.

Id. at E-1.
Id. at E-2.
Id. at E-2, -3.

157.

Id.
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had a less significant interest than a foreign government, such as
when there is neither a direct nor intended effect, then U.S.
enforcement authorities should not encroach. 158
The express
language of the 1977 Guide, however, maintained the possibility for
more intrusive enforcement. 159
In academia and the other Courts of Appeals, the Timberlane
doctrine received heavy criticism for being conceptually flawed, overly
discretionary, and outcome determinative. 160 Professor Grippando
argues that the exercise of restraint under Timberlane is "an abuse of
judicial equity power. ' 16 1 Moreover, a choice of law analysis provides
a better means for analyzing a court's interest in an extraterritorial
antitrust dispute. 162 Professor Maier describes the use of interest
balancing under Timberlane as "unfortunate."163 He further criticizes
the doctrine as focusing too heavily on national interests, failing to
assess the utility of assertion of jurisdiction, and weakening the
international system by focusing on short term goals. 16 4 The courts of
appeals have also considered many of the Timberlane implications,
with the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits adopting the general
doctrine and the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits criticizing
65
it.1

158.
Id.
159.
Id. The 1977 Guide has been criticized for its failure to make a precise
statement of the law. Joseph P. Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215, 254 (1978).
Its goal, however, was not to completely state the law, but rather to elucidate "an
intelligent enforcement program" that is generally consistent with existing law.
Donald I. Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
255, 257 (1978).
160.
Trenor, supra note 140, at 1601. See also Harold G. Maier, Interest
Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1983); James M.
Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Jurisdiction on Grounds of
InternationalComity: An Illegitimate Extension of the JudicialAbstention Doctrine, 23
VA. J. INT'L L. 395 (1983).
161.
Grippando, supra note 160, at 428.
162.
Id. at 402-03.
163.
Maier, supra note 160, at 590.
164.
Id. at 591, 593-94. Professor Maier would later criticize the then-proposed
Restatement (Third) for its continued reliance on a reasonableness inquiry rather than
elements that can create better certainty, predictability, and uniformity. Harold G.
Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 319-20 (1982). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit apparently found Professor Maier's
argument persuasive, citing it in the Laker Airways decision. Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belg. World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
165.
Accepting the Timberlane doctrine are: Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui &
Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted and vacated, 460 U.S. 1007, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 868-69
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979). Rejecting Timberlane are:
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B. Rejecting the Timberlane Rationale
The most prominent of the Timberlane doctrine rejections was
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in

Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.16 6

Laker

Airways Limited (Laker), a British corporation, offered no-thrill
transatlantic airline service between London and New York at a cost
of approximately one-third of that established by the International
Air Transport Association (IATA), a cartel that met annually to fix
prices for air travel. 167 The members of IATA viewed Laker as a
threat and in 1977 allegedly agreed to a predatory pricing scheme
aimed at driving Laker out of business. 168 In 1981, when the value of
the British pound deteriorated relative to the U.S. dollar, Laker
encountered financial difficulties because of inadequate hedging
between revenues received in British pounds and debts paid in U.S.
dollars. 169 Several airlines further lowered their prices and paid
extra commissions to travel agents for diverting passengers from
Laker. 170 IATA achieved its goal, and Laker liquidated in 1982.171
Laker's liquidator filed suit against IATA and its individual
172
members, alleging violation of U.S. antitrust law.
Midland Bank, a British corporation, feared it would be joined as
a defendant in Laker's U.S. action and as a result, filed a preemptive
action in the United Kingdom designed to prevent the District Court
from hearing Laker's claims. 1 73
The already named foreign
defendants in the Laker action initiated similar actions in the United
Kingdom. 174 The U.K. High Court on Justice responded, issuing an
interim injunction against Laker, preventing it from pursuing its U.S.
claims. 175 In response, Laker joined two new defendants, KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines (KLM) and Sabena World Air S.A./N.V. (Sabena), who

Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 939-41; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255
(7th Cir. 1980).
166.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 909. Professor Waller argues that courts
"mangle[d]" the Timberlane doctrine in part because the infrequency and difficulty of
foreign antitrust cases lead to an inability to determine the appropriate degree of
sensitivity to foreign concerns. Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 572 (2000).
167.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 916-17. Because the case originally rose under
a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court assumed the facts
presented in Laker's complaint as true.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 917.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id. at 917-18.
174.
Id. at 918.
175.
Id.
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had not filed for U.K. protection, and the District Court granted an
injunction against the two from joining the preemptive foreign
that the injunction
action. 176 KLM and Sabena appealed, arguing
177
violated principles of international comity.
The D.C. Circuit determined that the United States and the
United Kingdom shared concurrent jurisdiction over Laker's
claims. 178 The Timberlane factors, however, were not useful in
addressing which forum should maintain jurisdiction. 1 79 Moreover,
the Court noted that other courts and scholars had dismissed interest
balancing as a failed approach because U.S. courts rarely declined to
exercise jurisdiction.18 0 Without stronger legislative guidance, U.S.
courts were "ill-equipped to determine whether the vital national
interests of the United States or those of other nations should
Absent executive branch interference, U.S.
predominate."'181
the
antitrust law would be applied to Laker's claims. 182 Therefore,
183
District Court's decision to grant the injunction was affirmed.
C. The Restatements Address Timberlane and Laker Airways
The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Restatement (Second)), released in 1965, 11 years
before Timberlane, acknowledged the Alcoa effects test. 184 Section 18
noted that a sovereign could apply its domestic law to persons acting
outside of the territory if the conduct caused an effect within the
This extension, however, was subject to four
territory. 18 5
requirements:
(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of the activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
186
legal systems.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

918-19.
919.
915.
948-49.
950.

181.

Id.

182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 955-56.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
184.
STATES §§ 17, 30 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].

185.
186.

Id. § 18.
Id. § 18(b).
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Thus, the Restatement (Second) limited the reach of the Alcoa effects
test, thereby acknowledging many of Alcoa's critics.1 8 7 Moreover, in
§ 40, the Restatement (Second) embraced the principles of
international comity, which would later guide the court in
Timberlane.8 8 The combination of §§ 18 and 40 reflect the American
Law Institute's increased interest in international cooperation. 18 9
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Restatement (Third)), issued in 1987, replaced the
Restatement (Second) and § 18, in particular. 190 Section 402 of the
Restatement (Third) allows for the exercise of jurisdiction when there
is territoriality, nationality, or effects. 191 The effects basis for
jurisdiction closely resembles the "effects" test from Alcoa but differs
in that the conduct need not actually have the intended effect on U.S.
commerce. 19 2 Even when jurisdiction can be established, however, a
court should decline to exercise it if such exercise would be
unreasonable under principles of international comity. 193 Moreover,
this evaluation is guided by an interest-balancing test, which
instructs courts to consider the same factors as in Timberlane.194
These factors, listed in § 403, include:
(a)
the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating
state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the
territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the territory;
(b)
the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect;

187.
Id. § 18.
188.
Id. § 40. When two states share jurisdiction, each state should moderate its
enforcement in light of:
(a)
(b)

vital national interests of each of the states,
the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,

(c)

the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state,
the nationality of the person, and

(d)
(e)

the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.

Id.
189.

Id.

190.

Id.; RESTATEMENT

STATES

191.
192.
193.
194.

(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 402 (1987) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 190, § 402.
Id.
Id. § 403.
Id.
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(c)
the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
the regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
(d)
hurt by the regulation;
(e)
the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f)
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system;
the extent to which another state may have an interest in
(g)
regulating the activity; and
195
the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(h)

These factors represent explicit consideration of international comity
principles. 196 Moreover, to address the Laker Airways situation, the
Restatement (Third) suggests that when two countries have a
concurrent interest in regulating a particular activity, the country
with a weaker interest should defer to the stronger interest. 19 7 Thus,
even when a country may reasonably exercise jurisdiction over an
antitrust defendant, some circumstances will require deference to
The explicit
another country's more significant interests. 198
discussion of antitrust activities in §§ 402 and 403, however, retains
the possibility of the more expansive Alcoa effects test for
jurisdiction.' 99
D. Implications on the Economic Theory of InternationalAntitrust
Timberlane was the first major case in the history of U.S.
extraterritorial antitrust that did not follow the economic theory of
international antitrust. In its wake, Timberlane and the 1977 Guide
were heavily debated, were followed with decreasing frequency, and
were eventually rejected. 20 0 In the international system, intervention
became more important, and the United States maintained the clout
20 1
to influence strongly the policies and practices of other nations.
Moreover, the United States became a larger net importer than at
any other point in its history. The combination of international
power and net importer status suggests that, under the economic

Id.
195.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
Id.
198.
199.
Id. § 415 (examining the purpose of the anticompetitive conduct).
See supra notes 125-99 and accompanying text; see infra notes 242-71 and
200.
accompanying text.
201.
NYE, supra note 86, at 114-19, 132.
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theory of international antitrust, the Ninth Circuit should have
exercised jurisdiction over Timberlane's claims.
Laker Airways, on the other hand, attempted to embrace
implicitly the principles of the economic theory of international
antitrust.20 2 Despite extensive academic and judicial debate on the
role of international comity in determining the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law, the Supreme Court remained
ambivalent, denying certiorari in Timberlane and several of the other
pertinent cases. 20 3
This implicit acceptance and rejection of
international comity, however confusing, may best be described as
tacit approval of the courts of appeals determining extraterritorial
effect on a case-by-case basis. This is precisely what the Timberlane
court envisioned, and on occasion, the circuits reached the conclusions
suggested by the economic theory of international antitrust, and
other times the circuits did not. 20 4 This debate would continue until
the Court was presented with a case with facts where, although
Timberlane balancing suggested a denial of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court could not reasonably allow foreign law to
govern the antitrust activity. 20 5 This case would involve large sums
of money and a major industry, whereas the majority of the cases
from the late 1970s involved smaller antitrust activities with smaller
20 6
dollar amounts of alleged harm.

V. THE FTAIA AND NEW DOJ

GUIDELINES

A. CongressAttempts to EliminateAmbiguity
In 1982, Congress sought to clarify the ambiguities surrounding
the various interpretations of application of U.S. antitrust laws to
foreign conduct. 20 7 The result was the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act (FTAIA). 208
The FTAIA exempts U.S. export

202.
Id. at 139-41. See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text.
203.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 472 U.S.
1032 (1985); Mitsui & Co. v. Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
204.
See supra note 165.
205.
See infra notes 242-71 and accompanying text.
206.
See id.
207.
Jeffrey N. Neuman, Through a Glass Darkly: The Case Against Pilkington
plc. Under the New U.S. Department of Justice InternationalEnforcement Policy, 16
N.W. J. INT'L L. Bus. 284, 299 (1995).
208.
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)
[hereinafter FTAIA]. The FTAIA was born from Public Law No. 97-290. Section 402
amends the Sherman Act and is codified in § 6a while § 403 amends § 45 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (which is not discussed in this Note). The FTAIA states:
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commerce from antitrust laws unless there is a "direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce. 20 9 The FTAIA
aims to limit the scope of U.S. antitrust law when U.S. consumers are
not affected. 210 Congress initially hoped that the FTAIA would make
explicit the Sherman Act's application to overseas conduct, but the
result was poorly worded, thereby creating substantial ambiguity
211
regarding its application.
The overarching goal of the FTAIA is to prevent overzealous
courts from using U.S. antitrust law to protect foreign companies
from antitrust activity when the effects on U.S. commerce are
secondary. 212
There was, however, little description of what
constitutes a "direct, substantial, and foreseeable" effect. 213 By
designating "reasonably foreseeable" as an objective standard,
Congress explicitly removed the intent element from the Alcoa effects
formulation. 2 14 Nevertheless, the FTAIA retains the requirement
that the antitrust activity create an actual effect on U.S.
commerce. 215 Despite these strides toward streamlining the test for
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, the ambiguity of the
FTAIA's statutory language prevents the establishment of a clear test

Conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations.
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations;
or
(B)

on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and

(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of
this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation
of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct
only for injury to export business in the United States.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
See generally id.
211.
H.R. REP. No. 97-686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487.
212.
Cf. Neuman, supra note 207, at 304-05.
213.
FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
214.
See id.
215.
This effect is part of the Alcoa formulation.
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for determining "what degree of effects on U.S. exporters is sufficient
to trigger U.S. jurisdiction .... -216
The FTAIA does not deny U.S. courts subject matter jurisdiction
over antitrust claims brought by foreign parties.2 17 Because conduct
rather than citizenship gives rise to the antitrust claim, even efforts
directed abroad can be halted by U.S. courts if there is an effect on
the U.S. domestic market. 218 Most importantly, however, the lack of
language precluding claims by foreigners, combined with the FTAIA's
goal of protecting U.S. markets, indicates that Congress intended for
foreigners to have access to U.S. courts for alleged violations of U.S.
antitrust law regardless of where that conduct occurred. 2 19 The only
requirement is the requisite effects on U.S. domestic commerce;
220
effect violates the Sherman Act.
The FTAIA does not apply to conduct involving import trade or
commerce. 221 Therefore, the "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable" language should not apply to foreign cartels that ship
goods to the United States. 222 Lower courts, however, frequently use
the formulation to evaluate whether subject matter jurisdiction
should be granted in cases where only U.S. import markets are
implicated. 22 3 The Supreme Court has also applied the FTAIA to
import commerce cases. 224
Consequently, Congress' ambiguous
wording has led to abandonment of the FTAIA's original goal of
excluding some U.S. exporters from the restrictions of the Sherman
Act. 225 This deviation has led the FTAIA to be used as support for

216.
Neuman, supra note 207, at 305. Moreover, the FTAIA has been described
as "somewhat inscrutable," "inelegantly phrased," and not "destined for inclusion in a
manual of style." Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International
Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 287-88 (2002) (citing United States
v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)).
217.
FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a. See also Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign
Party Suits and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2122, 2137 (2001).
218.
Note, supra note 217, at 2137.
219.
Accord id. at 2138.
220.
Id. at 2139.
221.
Alford, supra note 118, at 17. Traditionally restraints were described as
either import trade or commerce, export trade or commerce, or totally foreign
commerce. Daniel T. Murphy, ModeratingAntitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction:The
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law (Revised), 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 786 (1986). The FTAIA collapses these last two
categories and subjects them both to its language. Id. at 787.
222.
Alford, supra note 118, at 17 (citing Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritorialityand
Antitrust-Is "Reasonableness"the Answer?, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 49, 54
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987)).
223.
Cf. id. at 17-19; See also Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac
v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
224.
See generally Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
225.
See generally id.; see also FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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the Timberlane progeny and its considerations of international
comity.

226

B. The 1988 Guidelines
President Ronald Reagan, guided by economists from the
University of Chicago, instituted a new era of economic policy, during
22 7
which laissez faire and the attitude of "law is economics" prevailed.
These sentiments pervaded the DOJ, which became less intrusive in
prosecuting foreign antitrust activity unless that activity affected the
U.S. economy; "the only antitrust offense is creation or use of market
power to cut back output and thus to raise prices ....*"228 In 1988,
this philosophy was formally adopted in the 1988 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988
Guidelines).229
The goal of the 1988 Guidelines was to "yield the best allocation
of resources, lowest prices, and the highest quality products and
services for consumers. '230 To serve these goals, the discussion of the
FTAIA included Footnote 159, which created an effects test
reminiscent of Alcoa:
Although the FTAIA extends jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to
conduct that has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect
on the export trade or export commerce of a power engaged in such
commerce in the U.S., the Department is concerned only with adverse
effects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers by reducing
23 1
output or raising prices.

This footnote did not explicitly ignore the *implications of
international comity suggested in Timberlane, but rather suggested a
more narrow approach to comity than the 1977 Guide. 232 The DOJ
had determined that comity concerns generally only arise "if
anticompetitive conduct within the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust

226.
FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a. The courts continued their extensive bickering over
how to apply the Timberlane doctrine, but National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card
Ass'n appears to have guided Congress and represents a less deferential approach to
the interests of foreign sovereigns. Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666
F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the first two parts of the Timberlane tripartite
analysis); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, supra note 211.
227.
Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
936, 958 (1987).
228.
Id.
229.
United States Department of Justice 1988 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Guidelines].
230.
Id. at S-5.
231.
Id.
232.
See id.
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laws is encouraged or promoted by the law or policy of a foreign
sovereign." 233 This language represented a stark change from the
1977 Guide, which recommended a limited scope for extraterritorial
enforcement. 234
The DOJ, however, exercised restraint by
scrutinizing foreign markets only if the antitrust activity decreased
235
the ability of a U.S. exporter to compete domestically.
Nevertheless, because of its broad language, Footnote 159 received
236
heavy international criticism, especially from Japan.
President George Bush's administration replaced pragmatism
with ideological rigidity and began more extensive antitrust
enforcement than had been extended under President Reagan. 23 7 As
part of this more ambitious enforcement strategy, then-Attorney
General William P. Barr announced in April 1992 that the
Department of Justice was removing Footnote 159 from the 1988
Guidelines. 2 38 This change once again permitted the DOJ to bring
lawsuits against foreign corporations who acted exclusively outside of
the United States if their operations were to the detriment of U.S.
exporters. 239 With this modification, the DOJ hoped to enforce more
zealously U.S. antitrust law as a means of keeping the increasing
trade deficit in check. 240 Nevertheless, the DOJ continued to express
a willingness to work with other countries in antitrust
24 1
enforcement.
C. Hartford Fire and Firm Rejection of Broad Interpretationsof
InternationalComity
Following the DOJ's doctrinal rejection of the principles of
international comity, the Supreme Court followed suit in Hartford
Fire Insurance v. California.242
Hartford Fire and the other

233.
Id. at S-22.
234.
Compare 1977 Guide, supra note 152, at E-2, -3 (suggesting limited scope
for extraterritorial enforcement), with 1988 Guidelines, supra note 229, at S-21
(proposing more rigorous review of extraterritorial activity).
235.
1988 Guidelines, supra note 229, at S-22.
236.
John R. Wilke, Hunting Cartels, U.S. Trust-Busters Increasingly Target
InternationalBusiness, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at A3.
237.
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a Clinton Administration, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 217, 218 (1993).
238.
U.S. Broadens Enforcement Posture on ForeignApplication of Sherman Act,
62 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1560, at 479 (April 9, 1992).
239.
Neuman, supra note 207, at 296.
240.
Id. at 297.
241.
U.S. Broadens Enforcement Posture on ForeignApplication of Sherman Act,
supra note 238, at 479.
242.
Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). The case originally
rose under a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the Court
therefore assumed the facts presented in Hartford Fire's complaint as true.
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petitioners alleged that several other insurance companies conspired
to restrict the terms and availability of commercial general liability
insurance in the United States, thereby violating § 1 of the Sherman
Act. 243 The defendants included: the Insurance Services Office, an
association of insurers who prepared the policies; four firms engaged
in direct sales of commercial general liability insurance who hedged
themselves with reinsurance policies; and a series of London-based
reinsurers who operated as syndicates and underwriters for Lloyd's of
London. 244 The London-based reinsurers moved to dismiss the claims
against them, arguing that principles of international comity barred
the application of U.S. antitrust laws to their activities, which had
occurred in the United Kingdom. 245 Central to this argument was the
fact that the British Parliament had expressly permitted the
246
antitrust activities.
On June 28, 1993, the Supreme Court ruled, in a five-to-four
decision, that U.S. antitrust law applied to the London resinsurers'
conduct. 247 The Court, led by Justice David Souter, noted that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that is intended to produce
and does produce substantial effects on U.S. commerce, and those
requirements were met in Hartford Fire's complaint. 248 The Court
believed that in enacting the FTAIA, "Congress expressed no view on
the question whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should
ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international
comity.' 249 The Court then determined that the only question was
"whether 'there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law.' ' 2 50
For the London reinsurers to assert that Parliament
permitted their conduct was "not to state a conflict. ''25 1 Merely
because antitrust activity is lawful in one country does not bar
application of U.S. antitrust law, regardless of the foreign
government's interest in regulating the conduct. 252 "Where a person
who is subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of
both," there is no conflict. 253 Because the U.K. reinsurers could

243.
Id. at 769. Commercial general liability insurance is insurance purchased
by businesses, non-profits, and government agencies for protection against the risk of
liability to third parties for personal or property injury. Id. at 770 n. 1.
244.
Id. at 764.
245.
Id. at 769.
246.
Id. at 798.
247.
Id.
248.
See generally id. at 794-99.
249.
Id. at 798.
250.
Id. (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
251.
Id. at 799.
252.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD),supra note 190, § 415, cmt. j).
253.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 190, § 403, cmt. e).
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comply with U.S. law without violating English law, there was no
conflict of laws. 25 4 Therefore, there was no reason for the lower
courts to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction for reasons of
255
international comity.
In an opinion that signaled a willingness to return to many of
the principles of American Banana, Justice Antonin Scalia
dissented. 2 56 He treated the question not as one of the jurisdiction of
the courts, but rather as the pre-Timberlane interpretation question
of congressional intent. 25 7 He then used two canons of statutory
construction to guide his inquiry into the legislative jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act. 258 First, without an intent explicit to the contrary,
congressional legislation "is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. '259 Boiler-plate language such as
260
that in the Sherman Act will not overcome this presumption.
Second, a law "ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains. '2 61 Statutes
should not be interpreted to "regulate foreign persons or conduct if
'262
that regulation would conflict with principles of international law.
Applying these canons, Justice Scalia then used Timberlane and the
Restatement (Third) to derive the relevant principles of international
law, including the reasonableness inquiry. 263
With these
observations, Justice Scalia noted that the activity took place
primarily in the United Kingdom and that the defendants were U.K.
corporations. Under such circumstances, he thought it "unimaginable
that an assertion of legislative jurisdiction would be considered
reasonable, and therefore, it is inappropriate to assume, in the
absence of statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress has
'26 4
made such an assertion.
The Court, however, retracted from the Timberlane stance of
interest balancing by nearly abolishing international comity
considerations. 265 Instead, the Court adopted a philosophy whereby a

254. Id.
255. Id. at 798.
256.
See generally id. at 812-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257.
Justice Scalia treated subject matter jurisdiction and the extraterritorial
reach of the Sherman Act as "two distinct questions .. " Id. at 812-13.
258. Id. at 814.
259.
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
260. Id.
261.
Id. at 814-15.
262.
Id. at 815.
263.
Id. at 817-19.
264. Id. at 819.
265.
Swaine, supra note 78, at 678. Some commentators have argued that this
near abolishment is not enough and that the comity inquiry should be entirely rejected.
See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement and the Myth of
InternationalConsensus, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 191 (1999).
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conflict of laws arises only if the law of one country compels a
violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. 266 This reflects a very narrow
understanding of the conflicts that can trigger considerations of
international comity and therefore, allows for an expansive notion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction without regard for the possibility of
"sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other
countries. '267 Foreign nations immediately balked at the ideas of
Hartford Fire because it expanded the potential scope for U.S.
antitrust law. 268 Moreover, they criticized the United States for
retaining the ability to prosecute foreign nationals for violations of
U.S. antitrust law, "even when the foreign nations that companies are
located in do. not even recognize those violations as crimes. '26 9
Compared to Timberlane, the Court's stance represented a riptide in
the "rising tide of cooperation in international antitrust
enforcement. '2 70 In the process, the Court had granted "a triumph
'2 7 1
for governmental regulation of anti-competitive behavior.
D. The Ineffective IAEAA and Clinton's Guidelines
To further complicate matters, the 1994 International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA) generated a new approach
toward regulating international antitrust. 272 The IAEAA grants the
U.S. Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the
authority to disclose to foreign authorities information helpful to
enforcing foreign antitrust laws or "determining whether a person
has violated or is about to violate any of the foreign antitrust
laws .... ,2 73 Moreover, the Attorney General's office is granted power

266.
Swaine, supra note 78, at 678.
267.
Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 820 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Alford,
supra note 118, at 225; Swaine, supra note 78, at 679.
268.
William P. Connolly, Note, Lessons to be Learned: The Conflict in
InternationalAntitrust Law Contrasted with Progress in InternationalFinancialLaw,
6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 207, 214 (2001).
269.
Id.
270.
Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: A
Postscript on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213, 230
(1993). Under the Court's reasoning, a court must ignore all conflicts that fall short of
an actual conflict between the laws of sovereigns. Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., Comity and the ExtraterritorialReach of United States Antitrust Laws,
29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 207 (1994). This allows for "inconsiderate extraterritorial
application of our laws." Id. at 208. Moreover, this construction has no basis in
modern conflict of laws theory. Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to
Foreign Conduct: Has Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerationsof Comity?, 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 221, 244 (1994).
271.
Swaine, supra note 78, at 682.
272.
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12
(1998) [hereinafter IAEAA].
273.
Id. § 6201.
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to aid a foreign antitrust authority in obtaining evidence of antitrust
activity. 2 74 These powers apply to violations of both U.S. and foreign
antitrust laws. 275
Provisions are made to establish appropriate
276
safeguards for the protection of confidential information.
Although these powers may initially appear quite broad, they
may not be exercised unless there is an antitrust mutual assistance
agreement in force with the foreign government. 277 An antitrust
mutual assistance agreement is a written agreement between the
United States and a foreign antitrust authority ensuring that the
foreign authority will provide assistance to the United States
comparable to that provided by the Attorney General and the FTC by
the foreign antitrust authority. 278
An exception to the written
agreement component is available if the Attorney General or the FTC
believes that the foreign antitrust authority will provide comparable
assistance and is capable of complying with the confidentiality
279
requirements.
Upon its enactment in 1994, the IAEAA was described as
groundbreaking legislation. 2 80 As late as 1998, however, no antitrust
mutual assistance agreement was in force. 2 81 The first antitrust
mutual assistance agreement was signed with Australia in 1999, but
282
it provides less assistance than originally envisioned in the IAEAA.
Moreover, the European Union and Japan have questioned their
abilities and interests in forming antitrust mutual assistance
agreements with the United States. 28 3 Thus, the IAEAA remains
essentially moot as a means of regulating international antitrust
284
activity.

274.
Id. § 6202(a).
275.
Id. § 6202(b).
276.
Id. § 6204.
277.
See id. § 6207.
278.
Id. § 6211(2)(A).
279.
Id. § 6207(a)(1).
280.
Connolly, supra note 268, at 224.
281.
Id.
282.
Id. at 225. Some of the reluctance to use the IAEAA may be a U.S. policy
judgment to pursue broader cooperation schemes through the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization
of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 378 (1997).
283.
Connolly, supranote 268, at 228-30.
284.
Id.
The ineffectiveness of the IAEAA is further demonstrated in the
informal accord reached between the United States and the European Union. The
agreement allows for simultaneous review by both governments of merger proposals
but, because the governments have differing standards toward reducing competition,
does not provide for cooperation in the evaluation of the proposals. Matthew J. Turosz,
EU-U.S. Antitrust Deal to Ease Merger Review, KIPLINGER Bus. FORECASTS, Oct. 3,
2000, available at 2002 WL 20611962. This agreement, however, represents a small
step toward resolving the policy differences over mergers between the United States
and the European Union. Thus, the JAEAA may become more relevant if and when the
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In 1995, the Clinton administration formally joined the
extraterritorial antitrust debate, as the DOJ and FTC issued a
revised version of the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations (1995 Guidelines). 285 The official goals of
the 1995 Guidelines are to "ensure open and free markets, protect
consumers, and prevent conduct that impedes competition .... 286
Moreover, the 1995 Guidelines reflect the Clinton administration's
willingness to pursue a policy for tough international antitrust
enforcement as a means of reducing the U.S. trade deficit. 28 7 In
accordance, the 1995 Guidelines adopted both the Hartford Fire
rationale for import cases and the FTAIA test requiring the antitrust
activity to have a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on U.S. commerce." 28 8 This potent combination allows the
agencies to regulate a substantial amount of antitrust activity
occurring abroad, even when it merely has an "effect" on, rather than
involves, import commerce. 28 9 The agencies, however, agreed to
consider fully comity factors in situations where there was not a true
conflict with foreign law. 290 There was no indication, however, that
these added considerations would lead to different results than under
the HartfordFire formulation, particularly with the 1995 Guidelines'
language cautioning that it is not "the role of the courts to 'secondguess the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity
"'291
concerns.
E. Implicationson the Economic Theory of InternationalAntitrust
By the mid 1970s, the United States was firmly established in
the world marketplace as a net importer. 292 Within the international
system, the United States became a stronger world power after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1 9 9 1 .293 Under this power structure,

governments converge on consistent policies, which would allow for mutual
enforcement. Id.
285.
United States Department of Justice 1995 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in 67 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) NO. 1707 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Guidelines].
286.
Id. at S-3.
287.
Neuman, supra note 207, at 297.
288.
1995 Guidelines, supra note 285, at S-8.
289.
Id.
290.
Id. at S-12.
291.
Id. (citing United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5
(D.D.C. 1990), affld, 908 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
292.
International Trade Administration, U.S. Total Exports Imports and
Balances: Table 26, available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/
aggregate/HOlT26.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. Aggregate Foreign
Trade Data].
293.
See NYE, supra note 86, at 180.
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the United States maintained substantial power, especially as
nuclear deterrence led to a further build-up of nuclear weapons. 294
Thus, the economic theory of international antitrust suggests that the
United States would maintain jurisdiction over the Hartford Fire
claims.2 95 With this result, the courts and economics officially
converged on a uniform result regarding the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law, thereby ending 296the discrepancy
between the two created by the Timberlane progeny.

VI. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT REJECTS EXPANSIVE NOTIONS OF
EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A. The Alleged Cartel and the DistrictCourt's Holding
Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As (Statoil), the plaintiff, is a
Norwegian corporation that owns and operates oil and gas platforms
in the North Sea. 297 The relevant defendants provide heavy-lift barge
services in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea and the Far East and
are: HeereMac, v.o.f., a corporation of the Netherlands; McDermott,
298
Inc., a U.S. corporation; and Saipem S.p.A., a U.K. corporation.
These companies maintained a worldwide monopoly on heavy-lift
barges from 1993 to 1997.299 During0 0 this period, Statoil purchased
3
services from HeereMac and Saipem.
In its complaint, Statoil alleged that the defendants created a
cartel, thereby conspiring to "fix bids and allocate customers,
territories, and projects between 1993 and 1997. '' 301 Under this
alleged agreement, HeereMac and McDermott gained exclusive access
to heavy-lift projects in the Gulf of Mexico, while Saipem received a
greater proportion of projects in the North Sea. 302 Because of this
agreement, Statoil contended that it and other purchasers of heavylift barge services in the Gulf of Mexico paid inflated prices for heavy-

294.
Id.
295.
See supranotes 1-51 and accompanying text.
296.
Id.
297.
Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 421 (5th
Cir. 2001). Until June 2001, Statoil was owned by the Norweigan government. Greg
Stohr, Top U.S. Court May Rule on Antitrust Suits over Foreign Cartels, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, October 1, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
298.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422 n.2. A heavy-lift barge can carry more than
4,000 tons, and the barge's services are used in the hoisting and transporting required
in the construction of offshore drilling platforms. High Court Seeks U.S. Input on
Review of FTAIA Case, 9 ANTITRUST LITIG. REP., Oct. 2001, at 4.

299.
300.
301.
302.

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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lift barge services in the North Sea. 30 3 These price increases
compelled Statoil to increase the price of crude oil it exported to the
30 4
United States in order to maintain satisfactory profit margins.
In December 1998, Statoil filed suit against the alleged cartel
members in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
alleging violations of U.S. antitrust law. 30 5 The case was assigned to
Judge Melinda Harmon of the Houston division, and on July 12, 1999,
she dismissed Statoil's complaint on a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 30 6 The court held that jurisdiction was
inappropriate because "Statoil's damages arise from its projects in the
Norwegian sector of the North Sea," rather than projects in U.S.
territory. 30 7 Moreover, the court held that the cartel's activities "did
not have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
anticompetitive effect" on U.S. trade or commerce. 308 Therefore,
Statoil's complaint failed to satisfy the FTAIA's jurisdictional
requirements, and as a result, the alleged injuries were not of the
30 9
type that U.S. antitrust laws could redress.
Statoil appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 310 Statoil argued that the FTAJA did not limit the access of
foreign plaintiffs to U.S. courts based on the site of the alleged
antitrust injury. 311 Moreover, the FTAIA should not preclude the
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction when the domestic effect on
U.S. commerce is different than the injury of which the plaintiff
complains. 3 12 Thus, Statoil urged the court to find that the cartel
caused Statoil to overpay for heavy-lift barge services, thereby
causing antitrust injury to Statoil and a secondary effect of increased
crude oil prices in the United States. 313 Under Statoil's reasoning,
the increase in domestic oil prices satisfied the domestic effect

303.
Id.
304.
Id.
305.
Id. at 423. Statoil's complaint was filed after the U.S. DOJ, in December
1997, filed a criminal complaint against HeereMac and one of its directors alleging that
the defendants conspired to eliminate competition in the heavy-lift barge industry. Id.
at 422. The defendants consented to U.S. jurisdiction, pled guilty to the charges, and
agreed to pay a $49 million fine. Id. at 422-23; Stohr, supra note 297. As a result,
numerous companies filed suit in the U.S. federal courts alleging injuries from
HeereMac's conduct. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 423. The first suit was filed by Phillips
Petroleum Company and its foreign subsidiaries. Id. On January 22, 1999, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims because they did
not arise from a direct and substantial effect on U.S. commerce. Id. at 423.
306.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 423.
307.
Id. (citing the district court opinion).
308.
Id. (citing the district court opinion).
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
Id. at 424.
312.
Id. at 425.
313.
Id.
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requirement, and therefore, Statoil satisfied subject matter
jurisdiction requirements. 314 The majority, however, rejected these
315
arguments.
B. The Fifth CircuitAffirms
In a two-to-one decision, the Fifth Circuit panel of Judge E.
Grady Jolly, Judge Emilio Garza, and Judge Patrick Higginbotham
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Statoil's antitrust claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3 1 6 The majority court, in an
opinion written by Judge Jolly and joined by Judge Garza, framed the
issue as one of statutory interpretation and sought to determine
whether the FTAIA was intended to grant foreign companies like
Statoil subject matter jurisdiction.3 17 The court initially recognized
the static nature of judicial interpretations regarding the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law throughout history. The
court became the first federal appellate body to interpret the FTAIA's
requirement that a domestic effect on commerce give rise to the
antitrust claim.3 18 The resulting interpretation required the court to
reject Statoil's contentions that it had satisfied the FTAIA's
3 19
jurisdictional requirements.
The court expressed doubt that "foreign commercial transactions
between foreign entities in foreign waters is conduct cognizable by
federal courts under the Sherman Act. '320 It then interpreted the
FTAIA to prohibit regulation of non-import foreign commerce unless
"(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on United States domestic commerce, and (2) such effect gives
rise to the antitrust claim. '32 1 The court determined that the cartel's
conduct of dividing territories and fixing prices had a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the U.S. market in
the form of increased crude oil prices. 322 Thus, Statoil satisfied the
323
first prong of the FTAIA.

314.
Cf. id. Statoil's injury was the "quid pro quo" leading to injury to the U.S.
market. David G. Keyko & Jessica Caplan, Federal Courts Explain Borders for
Antitrust Claims Involving Foreign Injuries, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2001,
Northeast Ed., at 12.
315.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 425.
316.

Id. at 421.

317.
Id. at 423-24.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. at 425.
320.
Id. at 426. This argument is based in the Commerce Clause, which allows
Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce and commerce with foreign
nations. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
321.
Id. (emphasis added).
322.
Id.
323.
Id. at 426-27.
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The court, however, found the second prong of the FTAIA more
problematic and determined that Statoil failed to show how increased
crude oil prices in the United States had given rise to its antitrust
claim. 324 The court interpreted the FTAIA as requiring that Statoil's
injury for an antitrust claim stem from the effect of higher crude oil
prices. 325 Statoil's injury, however, stemmed from the effect of the
higher prices it paid for heavy-lift barge services.3 26 Although the
court recognized a possible
connection and an interrelatedness between the high prices paid for
services in the Gulf of Mexico and the high prices paid in the North
Sea, the FTAIA requires more than a "close relationship" between the
domestic injury and the plaintiffs claim; it demands that the domestic
327
effect "gives rise" to the claim.

Higher oil prices in the United States had not harmed Statoil, and
therefore, the court determined that Statoil had failed the FTAIA's
jurisdictional requirements. 328 This finding required affirmation of
the District Court's dismissal of Statoil's complaint for lack of subject
329
matter jurisdiction.
The majority further reinforced its conclusion by examining the
FTAIA's legislative history. 33 0 While on the floor of the House of
Representatives, the purpose of the FTAIA was described as "more
clearly establish[ing]
when antitrust liability attaches to
international business activities. '' 331 Moreover, the record reflected
that "Congress intended to exclude purely foreign transactions . . .
from the reach of U.S. antitrust laws. '332 Although not controlling,
the court used the reasoning of the legislative history to further
33
preclude exercising jurisdiction over Statoil's claims. 3
Finally, the court justified its result as being consistent with
prior case law. 334 The court asserted that no U.S. court had exercised
jurisdiction "where a foreign plaintiff is injured in a foreign market
with no injuries arising from the anticompetitive effect on a United
States market. ''335 Therefore, Statoil lacked relevant precedent for its
contentions, and "when considered with the plain language of the

324.
Id. at 427.
325.
Id.
326.
Id.
327.
Id.
328.
Id.
329.
Id. at 431.
330.
Id. at 428-29.
331.
Id. at 428 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686, supra note 211, at 5, 8).
332.
Id.; But see H.R. REP. No. 97-686, supra note 211, at 10 (stating that
wholly-foreign transactions are covered by the FTAIA).
333.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428-29.
334.
Id. at 429.
335.
Id.
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statute and evidence of congressional intent," the record obligated the
Fifth Circuit to affirm the dismissal of Statoil's complaint for lack of
33 6
subject matter jurisdiction.
C. A PoignantDissent
Judge Higginbotham had "no hesitation" in concluding that the
FTAIA does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction over Statoil's
claims.3 37 Although Statoil is a foreign company, its injury was the
same as that of Americans who maintained a statutory right to seek
recovery. 338 With this observation, Higginbotham examined the plain
language of the FTAIA.33 9 He noted that § 6a(2) clearly states that
the effect on U.S. commerce "give rise to a claim" rather than the
'340
majority's reading of "'give rise to' the plaintiff's claim.
He interpreted this language to mean literally that the effect on
U.S. commerce must be sufficient to support a claim. 34 1
He
continued, "'a' has a simple and universally understood meaning. It
is the indefinite article ... If the drafters of the FTAIA had wished to
say 'the claim' instead of 'a claim,' they certainly would have. '3 42 The
FTAIA obviously exempted antitrust activities where the effects on
U.S. commerce are benign; there must be harm to U.S. competition as
a result of the activity. 343 Beyond that initial harm, however, the
literal text of the FTAIA "does not require that the effect on U.S.
commerce give rise to the plaintiffs claim. 3 44
Judge Higginbotham next examined the legislative purpose and
history surrounding the FTAIA. 34 5 Congress designed the FTAIA to
exempt from antitrust scrutiny U.S. exporting that does not harm
domestic commerce.3 46 Congress did not enact the legislation to limit
the liability of participants in international cartels that affect U.S.
commerce. 347 Statoil's claims involve an international cartel, and
thus, the original Sherman Act language controls.3 48 The majority's
view, on the other hand, attempted to limit the protection for
Americans affected by foreign antitrust violations in a manner

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 431.
at 431 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
at 431-32.
at 432 (emphasis in original).

at 432-33.
at 433.

at 434.
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contrary to explicit congressional intent. 349 This would transform the
boon for
FTAIA from "a safe harbor for American exporters into a 350
foreign cartels that restrain commerce in the United States."
To exclude foreign plaintiffs would lessen the ability of U.S. law
to deter antitrust activity because "conspirators facing antitrust
liability only to plaintiffs injured by their conspiracy's effects on the
United States may not be deterred from restraining trade in the
United States. 351 Moreover,
[i]f foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their
antitrust injuries, persons doing business both in this country and
abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies
affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits
they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at
352
home.

Such possibilities would undercut the ability of the Sherman Act to
principles indicated that U.S.
deter antitrust activity, and arbitrage
353
consumers would pay higher prices.
Furthermore, the legislative history undermines the majority's
restrictive interpretation of the FTAIA. 354 The legislative history
states that the FTAIA
does not exclude all persons injured abroad from recovering under the
antitrust laws of the United States. A course of conduct in the United
States ... would affect all purchasers of the target domestic products or
services, whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic. The conduct has
the requisite effects in the United States, even if some purchasers take
355
title abroad or suffer economic injury abroad.

With this language, Congress contemplated that foreign plaintiffs
such as Statoil could recover under U.S. antitrust laws. 356 Although
the majority correctly noted that "American ownership should not
create jurisdiction over a wholly foreign conspiracy," the fact was
neither "controverted, controversial, or relevant to this case" because
the heavy-lift barges were not U.S.-owned. 357 Moreover, the more
important, relevant language was omitted from the majority's

349.
See id. Moreover, such a concern "about increased access by foreign parties
to U.S. courts is misplaced; given the increasing ability of a course of conduct to affect
multiple nations, such access is a foreseeable consequence of the FTAIA's design."
Mehra, supra note 216, at 310.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 434.
350.
Id. at 435.
351.
352.
Id. (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978)).
Id. at 435.
353.
354.
Id. at 436.
355.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686, supra note 211 (emphasis in original),
citing Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 308).
Id. at 436.
356.
Id.
357.
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discussion and states that "if a conspiracy between two foreign firms,
regardless of American ownership, does have an effect on domestic
commerce, there is jurisdiction. '358 This language coupled with
express legislative intent supported a reversal of the District Court's
3 59
holding.
Finally, Judge Higginbotham noted that all other court of
appeals cases arising under the FTAIA granted jurisdiction to
plaintiffs like Statoil.3 60 Because he would have found subject matter
jurisdiction, he reached the standing inquiry.36 1 Statoil met standing
requirements because there was an injury in fact, an antitrust injury,
Therefore, Judge Higginbotham
and proper plaintiff status. 362
believed that the District Court should not have dismissed Statoil's
claims.363

D. Subsequent Developments
A discontented Statoil promptly appealed the Fifth Circuit's
decision to the Supreme Court. On October 1, 2001, the Supreme
Court invited the Solicitor General to file briefs on the matter.3 64 The
government responded, arguing that the Fifth Circuit's decision was
correct and "will not impair the United States' ability to enforce the
Sherman Act against international cartels. ' 365 The Supreme Court
agreed and, on February, 19, 2002, denied Statoil's petition for a writ
366
of certiorari.
E. Den Norske's Outlook
Economic principles suggest that the Fifth Circuit should have
maintained jurisdiction over Statoil's claims. Throughout the 1993 to
1997 time period during which Statoil allegedly paid artificially
inflated prices for heavy-lift barge services, the United States
remained a net importer. 36 7 The international trade deficit ranged

358.
Id.
359.
Id.
Id.
360.
361.
Id. at 437.
362.
Id. at 437-38.
363.
Id. at 439.
Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., 122 S.Ct. 28 (2001).
364.
365.
Review of FTAL4 Case Is Premature, U.S. Tells Supreme Court, ANTITRUST
LITIG. REP., Jan. 2002, at 6.
366.
Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., 122 S.Ct. 1059 (2002). Statoil's subsequent
petition for rehearing was denied on April 15, 2002. Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f.,
122 S.Ct. 1597 (2002).
367.
U.S. Aggregate Foreign Trade Data,supra note 292.
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from a low of $116 billion in 1993 to a high of $183 billion in 1997.368
The economic theory of international antitrust suggests that, because
the United States is a net importer, it will tend to overregulate
369
international antitrust activity when politically feasible.
Several political scientists have hypothesized that the
international system has become unipolar since the fall of the Soviet
Typically, unipolar systems are inherently
Union in 1991.370
unstable, and thus, most political scientists study the imminent
demise of the dominant country 371 For the moment, however, the
United States enjoys "a much larger margin of superiority over the
next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined
than any leading state in the last two centuries. '3 72 Moreover, the
United States has become the first modern international state that
dominates the economic, military, technological, and geopolitical
components of international power. 373 This international political
power structure suggests that the United States can strongly
influence the nature and quantity of international antitrust
activity. 374 The combination of this power and status as a net
importer suggests that the Fifth Circuit should have maintained
375
jurisdiction over Statoil's claims.
The question is why the Fifth Circuit declined jurisdiction. The
facts of this case do not present a compelling justification for the use
of limited U.S. judicial resources. Statoil, a foreign corporation,
attempted to use U.S. courts as a venue to assert antitrust claims
376
involving conduct occurring 3,000 miles from the United States.
Nevertheless, the antitrust activity allegedly resulted in higher oil

368.
Id.
369.
See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text. The choice-of-law model
developed by Professor Guzman, however, would establish a "presumption against
extraterritoriality, national treatment of foreign plaintiffs, and private rights of
action," which would each reduce the number of inefficient choice-of-law rules. Andrew
T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,90 GEO. L.J. 883, 939 (2002). Moreover,
when individual states lack incentives for efficient choice-of-law rules, strong
international organizations may prove useful. Id. This argument should not underpin
the conclusions of the economic theory of international antitrust because the interests
of individual nations are not aligned with global interests. See generally id.
370.
William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, INT'L SEC.,
Summer 1999, at 5. But see Christopher Layne, From Preponderance to Offshore
Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, INT'L SEC.,

Summer

1997, at 86;

Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise, INT'L
SEC., Spring 1993, at 5.
371.
Wohlforth, supra note 370, at 5-6.
372.
Id. at 7.
373.
Id.
374.

Id.

375.
376.

See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 297-315 and accompanying text.
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prices in the U.S. market.3 77 By failing to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over Statoil's claims, the Fifth Circuit defeated one of the
primary goals of U.S. antitrust law, protecting the consuming
public.3 78 These are not facts of a frivolous claim; U.S. commerce was
directly harmed, and the U.S. antitrust laws should remedy the
injury.

379

The Fifth Circuit, however, failed to make the connection
380
between the goals of antitrust and the facts of Statoil's complaint.
In reaching this result, the court, similar to those in most other
extraterritorial antitrust cases, failed to consider the implications of
the economic theory of international antitrust. 38 1 Nevertheless, most
of those other courts have reached the result anticipated by
economics. Den Norske is somehow different.
The Fifth Circuit panel in Den Norske based its decision
predominantly on its statutory interpretation of the FTAIA. The
court, however, should not have applied the FTAIA to Statoil's
complaint because the FTAIA applies only to a small subset of export
cases.3 82 It does not apply to import commerce cases.3 83 Statoil
alleged that the price of crude oil imported into the United States was
inflated, not the price of crude oil exported. 38 4 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court and several other lower courts have interpreted and
applied the FTAIA to import cases where the original language of the
Sherman Act should control.3 85 Moreover, those other courts have
still reached results consistent with the economic theory of
international antitrust.
Further, the majority's interpretation conflicts with the goals of
U.S. antitrust law. The Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation limits
the number and types of claims that foreign plaintiffs may assert in
U.S. courts. The FTAIA, however, was not designed to grant foreign
plaintiffs relief, but rather determines subject matter jurisdiction in
every qualifying case.3 86 Therefore, the majority's interpretation, at
its logical extension, requires that every plaintiffs pleadings must
demonstrate that the effect experienced personally is the same effect
38 7
as that of the overall U.S. marketplace (a microcosm, so to speak).

377.
Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 425 (5th
Cir. 2001).
378.
1977 Guide, supra note 152, at E-2.
379.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 425.

380.
381.

See generally id. at 420.
See generally id.

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

See FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
Id.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422.
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
Cf. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 426.
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This heightened pleading requirement removes court access from
many plaintiffs with legitimate claims, thereby further constraining
the ability of U.S. antitrust law to protect the consuming public. 388
Judge Higginbotham, on the other hand, appears to realize that the
Sherman Act, which includes the FTAIA, deals primarily with
defendants, not plaintiffs, and therefore, should not create a
389
heightened pleading requirement.
Through its dismissal of Statoil's claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit's decision conflicted with the
1995 Guidelines, which remain in effect.
The 1995 Guidelines
attempt to ensure free and open markets through aggressive
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. 390
Den Norske, however,
restricts the ability of foreign parties to seek such markets. 391 Thus,
theoretically, only the government can remove impediments to open
markets unless a party can establish a direct causal connection
between its purported injury and the alleged effect on U.S. commerce.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona has gone even
further than the Fifth Circuit's holding. 392 In United States v. LSL
Biotechnologies, Inc., the court required the type and scope of the
domestic effect to be the same. 393 Because the government was
unable to show a direct effect, the court dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 394 LSL thus removes much of the
discrepancy between the 1995 Guidelines and Den Norske by
disregarding existing regulations.
This result is particularly
troublesome because the court assumed a role whereby it secondguessed the executive branch's judgment. 395 This result further
deviates from the predictions of the economic theory of international
396
antitrust.
Moreover, Den Norske tacitly and implicitly reinstates the
considerations of international comity rejected by the Supreme Court
in Hartford Fire. The Fifth Circuit, by requiring that Statoil and the
U.S. market experience the same antitrust effect, proclaimed that the
United States did not have a substantially significant interest in the
matter. 39 7 Unlike Hartford Fire, however, the Fifth Circuit did not

388.
See 1977 Guide, supra note 152, at E-2.
389.
See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 432.
390.
1995 Guidelines, supra note 285, at S-3.
391.
See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431.
392.
United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6499
(Ariz. 2002).
393.
Id. at *17-18.
394.
Id. at *18-19.
395.
See generally id.
396.
See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text.
397.
See generally Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d
420 (5th Cir. 2001).
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attempt to superficially balance the interests of U.S. courts against
those of Norwegian or Russian courts and then deny comity
39 8
considerations because there was not a direct conflict of laws.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit inherently deferred to the interests of any
other court, asserting only that U.S. subject matter jurisdiction was

improper.
Despite the fact that all indicators suggest that the Fifth Circuit
should have maintained subject matter jurisdiction over Statoil's
claims, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the appeal. 399 Likely,
the facts of Statoil's case did not sufficiently compel space on the
Court's limited docket.
The result is that Den Norske remains
binding precedent within the Fifth Circuit and is persuasive
precedent elsewhere.
Thus, Den Norske maintains the same
procedural posture that Timberlane occupied for many years.
The similarities to Timberlane do not end there.
Through
October 1, 2002, Den Norske has been cited by ten courts in six
different circuits for the proposition that the FTAIA requires that the
U.S. domestic antitrust effect give rise to the plaintiffs claim. 40 0 The
Third Circuit, the District of Arizona, and the District Court for the
40 1
District of Columbia have affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reasoning.
The Fourth Circuit has followed a slightly modified interpretation of

Den Norske.40 2 The Second Circuit has rejected the Fifth Circuit's
rationale. 40 3
Finally, the Western District of Kentucky and the

398.
See generally id.
399.
Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., 122 S.Ct. 1059 (2002). Statoil's subsequent
petition for rehearing was denied on April 15, 2002. Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f.,
122 S.Ct. 1597 (2002).
400.
Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002);
Kruman v. Christie's Int'l, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 303 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2002); Sniado v. Bank Aus. AG, 174 F. Supp. 2d 159
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 829 (2001);
Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Crompton Corp. v. Clariant Corp., 220 F. Supp. 2d 569 (M.D. La. 2002); United States
v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6499 (Ariz. 2002); Empagran S.A.
v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20910 (D.D.C. 2001); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Latin Am. Imports, S.A., 187 F. Supp. 2d 749 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
401.
Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 307 (plaintiffs lacked standing because the injury
did not "flow from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful"); LSL, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6499 at *18 (holding that effects on seed prices did not have a direct effect
on the subsequent sale price of a tomato and, therefore, the United States did not meet
the FTAIA's jurisdictional requirements); Empagran, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20910 at
*5-13 (rejecting the foreign plaintiffs argument that, by paying higher prices for Class
Vitamins abroad, U.S. domestic prices rose, thereby satisfying the FTAIA's
jurisdictional requirements).
402.
Dee-K Enterprises, 299 F.3d at 296 (holding that the plaintiffs must show
that "the harm of which they complain had a substantial effect on our commerce").
403.
Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400 (holding that "the 'effect' on domestic commerce
need not be the basis for a plaintiffs injury, it only must violate the substantive
provisions of the Sherman Act").
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Middle District of Louisiana have held that the plaintiffs have
satisfied the FTAIA's direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect requirement. 40 4 Thus, the courts of appeal debate regarding
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law sparked by
Timberlane in the 1970s has reemerged in the 2000s. The true
question then is not why the Fifth Circuit denied subject matter
jurisdiction over Statoil's claims. Rather, it is when the Supreme
Court will find a set of plaintiffs with claims of a similar and
compelling magnitude to those presented in Hartford Fire and use
those plaintiffs to finally settle the current doctrinal debate.

VII. CONCLUSION

Beginning with Justice Holmes and American Banana nearly
100 years ago, the United States has remained ambivalent regarding
the potential extraterritorial application its antitrust laws. The
various branches of government began the 20th century with a
doctrine of strict territoriality but soon after shifted toward an
examination of the effects of the antitrust activity on U.S. commerce.
Since the 1970s, the branches of government have refrained the
question as one of statutory interpretation, embraced considerations
of international comity in Timberlane, modified those considerations
in Laker Airways, and eventually rejected many of those same
considerations in HartfordFire.
Throughout this chaos, however, the results reached by the
various branches of government have been remarkably consistent
with the economic theory of international antitrust. This theory
suggests that a country will use its domestic antitrust laws to
regulate foreign conduct when that country is both a net importer and
maintains the political power to compel international compliance.
Thus, with the Timberlane deviation, the United States has extended
jurisdiction over foreign parties for antitrust activity organized and
occurring abroad whenever it has been a net importer and
maintained sufficient international political power.

404.
Crompton, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (granting subject matter jurisdiction
under the FTAIA because the plaintiff alleged both domestic and foreign injury); Gen.
Elec., 187 F. Supp. 2d at 752-53 (holding that "LATAM has alleged a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on a U.S. market-that is, the export
market for U.S.-branded appliances to Peru-which, due to the fact that LATAM was
GE's only potential competitor in that market, gave rise to LATAM's antitrust claims").
By categorizing LATAM's market as the U.S. export market rather than the Peruvian
import market, the General Electric court appears to sidestep the Den Norske
requirement that the plaintiff and U.S. domestic commerce experience the same effect
from the alleged antitrust activity. See Gen. Elec., 187 F. Supp. 2d at 752-53.
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The Fifth Circuit has now entered the debate on extraterritorial
application of the U.S. antitrust laws. In Den Norske, the court
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the claims of a foreign plaintiff
injured by cartel activity occurring exclusively outside of the United
States. This result seems consistent with traditional notions of the
role of U.S. courts, but it is inconsistent with both the economic
theory of international antitrust and the antitrust laws' goal of
protecting the U.S. consuming public. Thus, the Fifth Circuit should
have exercised jurisdiction over Statoil's claims, thereby protecting
U.S. consumers from rising oil prices. The Fifth Circuit's result,
however, has already been embraced, modified, and rejected by a
variety of other U.S. courts. These discrepancies suggest that, at
some point when it finds a plaintiff with a claim of compelling
magnitude, the U.S. Supreme Court will reenter and settle the
current doctrinal debate on extraterritorial antitrust.
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